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Tuesday, February 26, 2013

These paragraphs helped me great deal to understand Bhabha and Spivak and what their deconstruction does to the postcolonial theory


For Bhabha the ‘emblem of the English book’ is one of the most important of the ‘signs taken for wonders’ by which the coloniser controls the imagination and the aspirations of the colonised, because the book assumes a greater authority than the experience of the colonised peoples themselves. But, as Bhabha argues, such authority simultaneously renders the colonial presence ambivalent, since it only comes about by displacing those images of identity already held by the colonised society[M1] . The colonial space is therefore an agonistic space. Despite the ‘imitation’ and ‘mimicry’ with which colonised peoples cope with the imperial presence, the relationship becomes one of constant, if implicit, contestation and opposition. Indeed, such mimicry becomes the very site of that conflict, a ‘transparency’, as Bhabha puts it, which is dependent for its fixity on the underlying negative of imperial presence which it seems to duplicate. For Bhabha ‘mimicry’ does not mean that opposition is rejected, but rather that it is seen to encompass more than overt opposition. Opposition is not simply reduced to intention, but is implicit in the very production of dominance whose intervention as a ‘dislocatory presence’ paradoxically confirms the very thing it displaces. The resulting hybrid modalities also challenge the assumption of the ‘pure’ and the ‘authentic’, concepts upon which the resistance to imperialism often stands. Indeed hybridity, rather than indicating corruption or decline, may, as Bhabha argues, be the most common and effective form of subversive opposition since it displays the ‘necessary deformation and displacement of all sites of discrimination and domination’.


Spivak’s and Bhabha’s analyses are important and very influential warnings of the complexities of the task faced by post-colonial theory. But they have also invited responses which see them and their approach as too deeply implicated in European intellectual traditions, which older, more radical exponents of post-colonial theory, such as Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi, had sought to dismantle and set aside. The debate is a struggle between those who want to align themselves with the subaltern and those who insist that this attempt becomes at best only a refined version of the very discourse it seeks to displace. All are agreed, in some sense, that the main problem is how to effect agency[M2]  for the post-colonial subject. But the contentious issue of how this is to be attained remains unresolved.

 [M1]Can we understand this as the colonized reading/understanding of the colonizer’s texts and meaning? The colonized mimic the West. But the very act of mimicry dislocates and subverts the meanings intended by the colonizer’s discourse. The notions of civilization, liberty and human freedom are taken from the colonizer’s discourse but deployed in the nationalist struggle to fight Western imperialism.
 [M2]Or is the question: is there an agency independent of the colonizer’s discourse for the colonized to exercise it to a different end?

Found this paragraph in the intro extremely interesting. And my response and questions this time are in the form of footnotes to this paragraph


"Gayatri Spivak questions whether or not the possibility exists for any recovery of a subaltern voice that is not a kind of essentialist fiction. Although she expresses considerable sympathy for the project undertaken in contemporary historiography to give a voice to ‘the subaltern’ who had been written out of the record by conventional historical accounts, Spivak raises grave doubts about its theoretical legitimacy. She is sympathetic but critical in her response here to Ranajit Guha’s subaltern studies project which seeks to obtain what Said termed the ‘permission to speak’ by going behind the terms of reference of ‘élite’ history to include the perspective of those who are never taken into account (the subaltern social groups). Recognising and applauding the project’s endorsement of the heterogeneity of the colonial subject, and giving a qualified approval to the politics of the effort to speak a ‘politics of the people’, Spivak is nevertheless concerned to articulate what she sees as the difficulties and contradictions involved in constructing a ‘speaking position’ for the subaltern. Wanting to acknowledge the continuity and vigour of pre-colonial social practice, its ability to modify and to ‘survive’ colonial incursions and definitional strategies and exclusions, she insists that the poststructuralist mode of the project only disguises what she sees as an underlying persistent essentialism[M1] [M2] . For her, one cannot construct a category of the ‘subaltern’ that has an effective ‘voice’ clearly and unproblematically audible above the persistent and multiple echoes of its inevitable heterogeneity. Her conclusion is that for ‘the true’ subaltern group, whose identity is its difference[M3] , there is no subaltern subject that can ‘know and speak itself[M4] . Thus the intellectual must avoid reconstructing the subaltern as merely another unproblematic field of knowing, so confining its effect to the very form of representation (‘text for knowledge’) the project sought to evade and lay bare. The conclusion is expressed, perhaps unfortunately, in a rather negative way: ‘Subaltern historiography must confront the impossibility of such gestures’. Spivak’s negative, as José Rabasa has pointed out, does not ‘necessarily exclude such instances of colonized subjects defracting power as those Homi Bhabha has isolated in the case of India’." (from the introduction of "The Postcolonial Studies Reader")





 [M1]Does this mean any engagement with 'what it was like before colonialism' or 'an attempt in the present to build our knowledge structures' cannot escape the essentialist streak while theorising? Fanon alludes to this when he says he doesn't want to legitimize past in the struggle/combat for independence against the colonialist forces. The questions that follow this line of thinking will be - Can past be revived in its pristine form after colonialist encounter? What happens to language that we speak? Will there be a language left unmixed with colonizer's language and its array of significance such that we can rebuild and reconstruct 'our' culture from that? To illustrate this let me take an example:
“India” as a category and a “nation”, many scholars have argued, was not available before colonialist encounter. It is only after the colonial experience we can have a nation and give that nation a name - India. But this category is unscrupulously used both in colonialist and non colonialist discourses.

The history that precedes the construction of the category of India becomes Indian history.
Indian history is not written showing us how specific events in time led to the emergence of India as a category and a nation but it is written tracing its history backwards where India has remained a singular entity from the Vedic civilization to the colonial invasion. The writing itself is such that there is something “essential”  in the categorical construct i.e. India which has flown like one river. We can recall here Foucault and his way of doing history. India can then be seen as an emergence at one particular point in time in history rather than a cumulative entity which has flown from Vedic civilizations.

This kind of essentialism which Spivak speaks has not completely gone from our discourses. We still speak of Indian Sciences and Indian knowledge as if there was something called India in Vedic times and the period that follows it along a continuum till the colonial encounter. 


 [M2]Also after colonial encounter it’s difficult to distill from what we are today - what is Eastern and what is Western/colonialist. Because colonial experience renders us incapable of recognizing what language meant before without conflating the meanings with colonizer’s language. Colonial encounter erases the colonized past and the colonized has to recognize her past from within the colonial experience she has had. Colonizer’s language does that to the colonized.


 [M3]I cannot know myself if I don’t encounter the other. Is this not in some way true of the West also?  Because after Saussure, one can’t help but say all identity lies in the difference.


 [M4] Is the question here: how can you distinguish a voice that is lost in the heterogeneity of voices? How can I discover this is my voice and my speech when I cannot know how my voice itself has so many others in it? When Dipesh Chakrabarty speaks of the project in History to provincialize Europe and bring in heterogeneity into history, my rather naive question is 'isn't doing 'History' itself a European idea? what can be done instead of history? ' 'Itihasa'? so as not to universalize a European paradigm? Haven't we equated 'Itihasa' with history  to the extent that we don't know whether there was any other way of doing Itihasa? Haven't we lost in the act of translation (which is itself a product of colonial encounter), the ability to retain the significance of signs in the colonized culture?  

Sunday, February 17, 2013

Manuel Delanda explaining Deleuze

This video series helped me a great deal to understand Deleuze. Follow the link if you are interested too
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IKIsA8yhP58

POSTSCRIPT ON SOCIETIES OF CONTROL: Keywords



Deleuze develops the Foucaultian thought on history of societies and how they are governed from societies of sovereignty to disciplinary societies (Foucault's terms) to societies of control (Deleuze's term).
Keywords:
Computer as the new machine or apparatus – similar to Networks of automatons in Rhizomes
Training which never ends
The spirit of corporation
Obsolete disciplinary mechanisms

On Rhizomes


[NOTE: the content within parentheses, small font are my comments and doubts]

Book has only itself; it is neither a signifier nor a signified. We will not look for anything to understand in it
Book exists only through the outside and on the outside
Literature is an assemblage
All we talk about are multiplicities
The Tree is already the image of world

Principle of Unity
            From Dichotomous root and tap root
                                    to        
Supplementary dimension of folding
Radicle chaosmos rather than root cosmos
Rats are rhizomes; burrows are too!
(Chomskian linguistic practice of parsing a sentence into noun phrase and verb phrase and the standard practice of deriving words from roots.)

Principle of Connection and Heterogeneity
            Any point of rhizome must be connected to any other and must be
            A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connection between semiotic chanins, organizations of    circumstances relative to arts, sciences and social struggles
There is no language in itself; nor are there any linguistic universals, only a throng of dialects, patios, slangs and specialized languages. There is no ideal speaker-listener, any more than there is a homogeneous linguistic community. Language is .... an essentially heterogeneous entity. There is no mother tongue, only a power takeover by a dominant language within a political multiplicity... A language is never closed upon itself, except as a function of impotence
            (Further critique of linguistics and its assumptions as a discipline)

Principle of Multiplicity
            Ceases to have any relation to the One as
·         Subject or object
·         Natural or spiritual reality
·         Image or world
There is no unity to serve as a pivot in the object or to divide in the subject
A multiplicity is neither subject not object, only determinations, magnitudes and dimensions that cannot increase in number without multiplicity changing in nature
Assemblage – an increase in dimensions

(Who controls puppets? Should we stop at the artists or extend to his nerve fibres? Will that not be an increase in dimension?)

There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a Structure, Tree or Root. There are only lines
(Structures – societies, civilizations, system;
Tree or Root – evolutionary schemas, linguistic derivations
Root – origins and beginnings, tendency to start everything at the beginning)
(Is this a comment on the human understanding of the world? A comment  on the human knowledge and its history?)

Concepts are lines
All multiplicities are flat, n Dimensional, Asubjective and Asignifying
It is an asignifying rupture  
(Knowledge trying to explain everything about anything and saying ‘this is all it is about it’. Knowledge seems to offer full explanations leaving little for doubt. It’s too confident)

Segmentarity
Aparallel evolution
RHIZOME IS ANTI GENEALOGY

Principle of Cartography and Decalcomania
            A rhizome is a stranger to any idea of genetic axis and deep structure
TRACING” – the tree articulates and hierarchizes tracings; tracings are like the leaves of a tree
A rhizome is a map and not a tracing
Rhizome has multiple entry ways. A map has multiple entry ways as opposed to the tracing which always comes back to the same point. The map has to do with performance whereas tracing always involves alleged competence
SCHIZOANALYSIS – rejects any idea of pretraced destiny, whatever name is given to it – divine, anagogic, historical, economic, structural, hereditary and syntagmatic

SUBJECTIFICATION OF AFFECTS
There exist tree or root structures in rhizomes; conversely, a tree branch or root division may begin to burgeon into a rhizome. The coordinates are determined not by theoretical analyses implying universals but by a pragmatics composing multiplicities or aggregates of intensities. A new rhizome may form in the heart of a tree, the hollow of a root, the crook of a branch
We are tired of trees. We should stop believing in tree, roots and radicles. They have made us suffer too much. All of the arborescent culture is founded on them, from Biology to Linguistics to Psychoanalysis
Thought is not arborescent, and the brain is not a rooted or ramified matter
Grass / couch grass
Arborescent systems are hierarchical systems with centres of significance and subjectification, central automata like organized memories... such systems pre-exist the individual, who is integrated into it at an allotted place (significance and subjectification)
To CENTERED  SYSTEMS authors propose a contrast of ACENTERED SYSTEMS/FINITE NETWORKS OF AUTOMATA in which communication runs from any neighbour to the any other, the stems and channels do not pre-exist, and all individuals are interchangeable, defined only by their state at a given moment – such that the local operations are coordinated and the final, global result synchronized without a central agency

DON’T REDUCE BUT PRODUCE
            The tree has dominated all Western reality and thought
            WEED leads the most satisfactory life of all
            Don’t go for the root, follow the canal
There is no universal capitalism, there is no capitalism in itself; capitalism is at the crossroads of all kinds of formations, it is neo capitalism by nature. It invents its eastern face and western face, and reshapes them both...
KNOTS OF ARBORESCENCE IN RHIZOMES AND RHIZOMATIC OFFSHOOTS IN ROOTS
ROOT TREE – CANAL RHIZOME are not two opposed models: the first operates as a transcendental model and tracing, even if it engenders its own escapes; the second operates as an immanent process that overturns the model and outlines a map, even if it constitutes its own hierarchies, even if it gives rise to a despotic channel

AN ANEXACTITUDE
            In the middle/ between things/ interbeing
            TREE – verb- ‘to be’
            RHIZOME – conjunction – ‘and, and, and...’
            Establish a logic of the ‘AND’


Sunday, February 10, 2013

What I want to learn from today’s discussion on Foucault's ideas


Foucault’s approach is broadly classified under the tag ‘New Historicism’. What is ‘new’ about the history that he does? He showed us how ideas like madness and sexuality which were taken to have no history at all (transcendental and metaphysical concepts so central to explain the ‘origin’ in historical interpretations) had a history and emerged at particular point in time in the history of Western civilization. Foucault seems to make a distinction between archaeology and genealogy as methods/approaches to history. What is exactly this distinction? In his essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy and History”, he charts out the details of a genealogical approach to history (he sometimes terms it as “Effective History”) against traditional approach to history. In his another essay “What is Enlightenment?” he says that his work is mainly “genealogical in design and archaeological in its method”. I want to know what is this difference that Foucault is pointing at? I feel that this difference is very central to the understanding of ‘what is it that Foucault did as a historian?’ Or to rephrase it, how did Foucault do what he did which resulted in shaking the traditional way of doing history?